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Most investigations that examine diffusion of disease through urban areas give 
relatively scant attention to the ‘micro-environment.’  Employing the many methods of 
macro-environmental analysis, most studies do not attempt to identify street-level or even 
residence-level temporal-spatial patterns of disease diffusion.  As a result, the 
mechanisms that lead to diffusion on such small scales are left relatively undefined. 
There is no doubt that cumulatively these small-scale mechanisms contribute to the 
diffusion of disease over the urban environment.  However, the level of contribution and 
the specific details of their dynamics remain unclear.   
 This thesis investigated some of these unexplored areas by presenting a temporal-
spatial analysis of the Memphis Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878.  The area (downtown 
Memphis), the time (August-December 1878), and the epidemic (yellow fever) are 
centered around a collection of books, maps, and reference materials that range from 
contemporary accounts of the epidemic to modern virology texts.  This information was 
used to construct a modern database and GIS that could be analyzed and manipulated by 
various statistical means. Hot spots and multi-death residences in particular were 
examined for interrelated patterns. Temporal-spatial cartographic representations of these 
areas proved to be the easiest means by which to extract disease patterns.  Results 
indicated that social and cultural interactions probably play a greater role in yellow fever 
dissemination than previously thought.  However, additional studies of complete data sets 
are required for a more comprehensive understanding of the exact dynamics and 
mechanisms that underlie urban yellow fever diffusion.   
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- CHAPTER ONE - 
 INTRODUCTION  
Bloom (1993, 1) called the Memphis Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 “the 
grandest misfortune that ever marked an American city.” Indeed, in terms of human life, 
its toll surpasses that of the Chicago fire, the San Francisco earthquake, and the 
Johnstown flood, combined.   
Despite its acclaim as one of the greatest urban disasters in U.S. history, the 
Memphis Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 has been given little attention by modern 
analysts, historians, geographers, and medical experts.  Because of yellow fever’s 
potential as a re-emerging infectious disease, more insight is needed into its urban 
diffusion patterns for containment and control purposes—insight that an analysis of the 
Memphis epidemic could reveal.   In addition, any results that may precipitate from a 
historical temporal-spatial analysis of yellow fever could directly apply to other viruses in 
its family, most notably dengue fever.  It is hoped that with further investigation such 
diseases can be permanently contained or eradicated, leading to decreased human 
morbidity and mortality worldwide. 
Using modern statistical-spatial geographical information science (GIS) 
techniques, this thesis tries to cover some of the unexplored ground of yellow fever 
epidemiology by examining the potential urban spatial diffusion patterns that occurred 
within the Memphis epidemic of 1878.  Due to the unprecedented nature of both the test 
subject (Memphis, 1878) and the methodology (local area statistics and GIS), this thesis 
falls into the realm of an exploratory epidemiological investigation. The null hypothesis 
for this study is that diffusion of yellow fever through Memphis will follow a random 
 2
distribution that is unassociated with micro-environmental factors, namely human social 
dynamics.  It is expected that urban yellow fever diffusion patterns will lie within 
clustered areas of disease mortalities that are linked to human social dynamics.  
This study brings together approaches and insights from a knowledge base of 
several disciplines including history, epidemiology, and geography.  The epidemic under 
question occurred in 1878, so historical datasets from that period are utilized.  The 
investigation of the disease requires an understanding of the ecology, pathology, 
immunology, and especially the epidemiology of yellow fever. And finally, the analysis 
is geographical, with both spatial-analytical and GIS approaches being used to understand 
the spatial relationships within the epidemic.       
Chapter Two provides an overview of the pertinent literature from the three 
contributing disciplines. Chapter Three is a review of the data source, Keating’s 
publication of 1879, from which many first-hand accounts are extracted. This is meant as 
a qualitative background for this study.  Chapter Four provides an overview of the 
methods and analyses used in this study, while Chapter Five summarizes the results.  
Chapter Six provides an interpretation of the results and places these within the larger 
context of this thesis.    
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- CHAPTER TWO - 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Geography and Medicine 
The interaction of health and space can be found throughout the recorded history 
of medical investigation due to the importance that ‘environment’ plays in disease 
manifestation.  In fact, as long as there was a consciousness about health there was 
probably a consciousness about ‘medical geography’; after all, the source of many health 
problems usually lies within the cultural or physical environment.  Important contributors 
to medical inquiry, from Greek philosophers like Hippocrates to the English physician 
John Snow, have almost always included geographical elements in their investigations.  
This fact is commented on by May (1958, iv), who states that “throughout history the 
physician has always been concerned with geographic problems, partly because, tied to 
his patients like the galley slave to his oar, he cannot gratify his own wanderlust, and 
partly because he is interested in knowing the world in which we live.”  
Mayer (1984, 2680) defines medical geography as the “discipline that describes 
spatial patterns of health and disease and explains those spatial patterns by concentrating 
on the underlying processes that generate identifiable spatial forms.”  He notes that there 
are three critical areas to the study of medical geography: spatial analysis of disease, 
disease mapping, and disease ecology.  Spatial analysis of medical data is used to reveal 
disease patterns and to show how geographic factors influence disease diffusion, 
movement, and periodicity. Disease mapping is the representation and visualization of 
these patterns using charts, maps, and animations. Disease ecology attempts to interpret 
these patterns based on the relationship between culture, environment, and disease.   
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This study is an exercise within the field of medical geography that hopes to 
investigate temporal-spatial patterns of historic urban yellow fever diffusion using 
Mayer’s approach of spatial analysis, disease mapping, and disease ecology.   
2.2 Comparative Studies in Medical Geography 
 As mentioned before, the study of disease and space is not new.  As technology 
improves and computer-based spatial investigation tools become both more powerful and 
accessible, more historical data can be consulted for clues about diseases which, although 
not so frequent today, could provide insights into emerging epidemics of either natural or 
induced origin.     
  The leading “classical” examiners of historical diseases and medical geography 
are Mathew Smallman-Raynor and Andrew D. Cliff.  They (2000) published one of the 
leading studies that integrates medical geography and the use of GIS by examining the 
impact of war on the spread of cholera in a civilian settlement system.  They obtained 
their data on area, time, and the epidemic from the U.S. Public Health Records.  Using 
advanced GIS techniques, including lag times, trend surfaces, autocorrelation, and 
centroids, they geographically reconstructed the spread of cholera during the Philippine-
American War.  They found that the Philippine-American War had the effect of 
increasing the rate at which geographical diffusion of cholera occurred.  Using a very 
similar method, Smallman-Raynor and Cliff (2001A) examined the transmission of 
typhoid fever in encampments of mobilized US troops during the Spanish-American War.  
They drew their data from archival records of a report prepared by medical officers 
during the war.  They used this information to reconstruct the spread of typhoid within 
the camp and to model the diffusion process that drove the disease’s dissemination.  This 
 5
article also examined the epidemiological spread from an analytical point of view, and 
even suggested a new type of spread, transfer diffusion.  As the authors mentioned, the 
methodology and conclusions of this article pave the way for future studies of 
epidemiological transmissions in camp settings.    
In an article that examined the spatial dynamics of polio diffusion in the United 
States, Smallman-Raynor and Cliff (2005A) investigated the variances in spatial 
transmission between the emergence of the disease in 1910-1955 and the retreat of the 
disease in 1955-1971 after introduction of a vaccine.  Their article reiterated the 
importance of understanding the processes that underlie why infectious diseases emerge 
and reemerge.  Their study found that spatial dynamics of polio dissemination both in 
emergence and reemergence were a result of geographic processes.    
Smallman-Raynor and Cliff have also published additional articles on the 
diffusion patterns of cholera in the Philippines in 1899-1902 (Smallman-Raynor and Cliff 
2001B), the spatial anatomy of a 1918-1919 British influenza epidemic (Smallman-
Raynor and Cliff 2002), and the spatial structure of a 1916 poliomyelitis outbreak in the 
northeastern United States (Smallman-Raynor et al. 2005B). 
Curson (1985) examined various epidemics that struck Sydney, Australia, from 
1788 to 1900.  Though he did not employ GIS or spatial analysis in his book, Curson did 
provide insight into the cultural and socio-economic impacts of these epidemics as well 
as information on how they spread through the city.  Chase (2003), like Curson, 
examined the cultural and socio-economic impacts of the San Francisco Plague Epidemic 
of 1900.  Though not as technical as Curson, she did explore the epidemiological factors 
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of the spread of the disease, including the sewer system of the city and the reactions of 
the people to Chinese immigrants who were treated as scapegoats.  
Relatively few scholarly articles exist that examine an epidemic’s diffusion 
through a micro-environment such as block architecture or multi-resident localities. 
Wilson (1993, 276-287) examined the diffusion of a Finnish smallpox epidemic using 
referenced historical accounts to show the village-by-village mortality spread and 
compares them to a computer-simulated model.  His results showed that at macro-levels 
the computer models are accurate, but at the micro-level the computer simulation cannot 
be used to accurately represent mortality maps.  In comparison, Curtis (unpublished) has 
examined the diffusion of yellow fever in New Orleans in 1878 relative to multi-death 
residences.  His results are showing that urban yellow fever diffusion is related to 
complex temporal-spatial patterns associated with nativity and cultural associations.   
This investigation enlists Curtis’s current work in New Orleans for a comparative 
examination of Memphis.  However, because nativity and age data is not available for 
Memphis, this study will concentrate on other possible factors related to urban temporal-
spatial patterns of diffusion that occurred in Memphis in 1878.  It is hoped that this study 
can contribute to the pre-existing body of knowledge concerning yellow fever and 
medical geography, and can explore a few novel approaches that underpin the complexity 
of urban yellow fever diffusion.   
2.3 Concepts of Infectious Disease Epidemiology  
Rothman and Greenland (1998) believe that the key to understanding infectious 
disease epidemiology lies in the method of disease transmission.  In order for an 
infectious agent to survive, transmission from one host to another must occur 
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successfully. Unlike with noninfectious disease, infectious disease transmission involves 
susceptible individuals who are exposed to infected individuals of the same population.  
Exposure can depend on many factors, such as the mode of contact, the mixing habits of 
the infective and susceptible hosts, the ecology of the vector, and the level and extent of 
infectiousness.  These exposure factors are what create unique spatial patterns of disease 
dissemination.   
Temporal factors also play a key role in transmission.  Usually, infectious disease 
progresses through a timeline when critical ‘windows’ allow transmission to occur. 
Progression of the timeline begins when the host is infected by the agent.  At this point 
the latent period starts, when the agent either propagates or transforms inside the host.  
During this time, transmission cannot occur.  Following the latent period is the infectious 
period, when titers of the agent in the host are adequate enough for exposure to lead to 
transmission to another host. But after the infectious period follows another time when 
transmission cannot occur—the noninfectious period—when recovery, death, or loss of 
the agent occurs within the original host.  Depending on how the disease manifests itself, 
there can be a symptomatic period, when the host presents with symptomotology.  This 
period ends with either death or recovery. If the host recovers, he or she can remain as an 
infectious carrier or become immune to future infections. Sometimes there is no 
symptomatic period in the host because symptoms do not manifest.  In this instance, the 
infection is termed silent or inapparent (Rothman and Greenland 1998). The time at 
which the latent, infectious, non-infectious, and symptomatic periods occur creates 
temporal patterns of transmission that are unique to each disease. 
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2.4 Yellow Fever and Medicine  
Yellow fever’s transmission involves complicated temporal-spatial patterns that 
make it a difficult disease to analyze. Yellow fever is an arthropod-borne meta-zoonotic 
infectious disease.  It is zoonotic because it can be transmitted from animals to man; it is 
transmitted by an invertebrate vector, the mosquito, so it is arthropod-borne; and, it is 
meta-zoonotic because yellow fever requires a vector for its multiplication and 
development.  Thus, yellow fever’s transmission patterns depend upon a complicated 
convergence in time and space of agent, reservoir, vector, and host. Each of these in turn 
has its own unique ecology that presents added dimensions to yellow fever epidemiology.   
The zoonotic process of yellow fever involves two cycles: a sylvatic cycle and an 
urban cycle (Knipe et al. 2001).  The sylvatic cycle, called ‘jungle’ yellow fever, is the 
cycle of yellow fever that is constantly maintained in endemic areas, namely Africa and 
South America.  It involves non-human primates, like wild monkeys, and tree-hole 
breeding Aedine mosquitoes, like Haemagogus. Normally primates serve as the reservoir 
that maintain the disease within their population; however, recent studies in South 
America have shown that other vertebrates, like endenates, marsupials, and rodents, can 
also serve as reservoirs for yellow fever transmission (Knipe et al. 2001).  It must be 
noted that the natural, or ‘normal,’ cycle of yellow fever does not include humans. 
Humans become involved when they converge in time and space with sylvatic 
vectors and reservoirs of the jungle yellow fever cycle.  In many cases, subsistence 
strategies that require man to penetrate jungles leads to a single infection that is carried 
into an urban area. Once the infectious carrier reaches the city, Aedes aegypti can 
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transmit the virus to other members of the surrounding human population, beginning an 
urban yellow fever epidemic (Knipe et al. 2001).  
2.4.1 The Yellow Fever Virus 
 Peter Medawar (1983, 2), the 1960 recipient of the Nobel Prize for Medicine and 
Physiology, defines a virus as “a piece of nucleic acid surrounded by bad news.” Yellow 
fever virus is bad news. It is from the genus Flavivirus, the same genus that contains 
Wesselsbron, Zika, West Nile, Japanese Encephalitis, and Dengue viruses. Yellow fever 
is also grouped with viruses that induce hemorrhagic fever in humans: Lassa, Dengue, 
Ebola, and Marburg, to name a few (Knipe et al. 2001).  Figure 2.1 is an electron 
micrograph of yellow fever virions. 
 
Figure 2.1: Electron Micrograph of Yellow Fever Virions (Image Courtesy of the 
CDC Public Health Image Library, 2005)   
 
The virion of yellow fever has a single, non-segmented strand of positive-sense 
RNA that encodes about ten genes (Oldstone 1998).  It is spherical in shape and forty to 
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sixty nanometers in length—the smallest RNA virus isolated in man (UTMB GSBS 
2005). Attachment, fusion, and penetration of the host cell by the virion are aided by a 
single surface glycoprotein located in the lipid-rich virion envelope. Once in the 
cytoplasm of the host cell, the virion migrates to an organelle membrane, usually that of 
the golgi apparatus, where it matures and replicates (UTMB GSBS 2005).  
Rice et al (1985) discovered that yellow fever virus’s single strand of RNA 
contains exactly 10,233 nucleotides that potentially could encode a polypeptide chain of 
3,411 amino acids.  Amino-terminals of 780 residues of this polypeptide chain make up 
the virus’s structural proteins. This unique organization of yellow fever’s RNA helps 
scientists link it evolutionarily to other RNA viruses.   
2.4.2 The Vector 
 The most important vehicle for the transmission of virus from host to host in 
urban yellow fever is the arthropod Aedes aegypti, or the domestic mosquito.  This 
mosquito became notorious when in 1900 the U.S. Army physician Walter Reed 
demonstrated that Aedes aegypti could transmit yellow fever virus from patient to patient 
(Knipe et al. 2001).  Since that time, this simple mosquito has provided the foundation for 
yellow fever epidemiology and the evolution of non-vaccine yellow fever control 
(Monath 1988).  Figure 2.2 is an illustration of Aedes aegypti. 
Critical to Walter Reed’s discovery of Aedes aegypti as the vector of yellow fever 
was the recognition that these mosquitoes had to be incubated for about 12 days after 
ingestion of an infective blood meal from a yellow fever patient before they could 
transmit the virus (Monath 1988).  Originally, this concept was suggested by Carter in 
1898 after his observation that secondary cases of YF usually occurred fifteen to twenty-
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three days after a primary case.  Once the mosquito has ingested an infected blood meal, 
virus titers usually decrease tenfold during an eclipse phase that can vary from one to 
four days.  The eclipse phase period is dependent upon quantity of ingested virus and the 
extrinsic incubation temperature.1   
 
Figure 2.2: Aedes aegypti, the Vector of Yellow Fever (Image Courtesy of the CDC 
Public Health Image Library, 2005) 
 
Kettle (1984) notes that Aedes aegypti is suited for a highly adapted domesticated 
lifestyle alongside humans and thus is the perfect vector-component for an urban yellow 
fever epidemic.  These blood-sucking anthropophilic insects show complete toleration for 
urban settings, and can even complete their entire life cycle inside a single human 
dwelling without ever going outside. They thrive in warmer tropical and sub-tropical 
                                                
1 Most reports show that arboviruses like yellow fever have extrinsic incubation periods in mosquitoes that 
are inversely related to temperature within temperature ranges that allow virus replication; Monath (1988) 
reported the extrinsic incubation period for yellow fever virus at 25°C to be 28 days, and at 30°C 12 days.   
 12
climates, clinging to a 20°C isotherm correlated to 40°N and 40°S, but occasionally 
venture outside this belt depending on yearly fluctuations in temperature.   
Unlike many other arthropod vectors, Aedes aegypti has spread its geographic 
range and the range of many diseases through adaptations in egg development (Kettle 
1984).  Resistant to desiccation and capable of diapausing for up to a year, Aedes 
aegypti’s eggs can be laid in any form of standing water—from small containers like 
cereal bowls in a cabinet, to larger peridomestic water sources like old tires and barrels, 
to temporary saline ground pools in salt marshes. Eggs can dry out and survive cold 
temperatures, allowing mosquitoes to span seasons in colder geographic areas.  Eggs that 
are in diapause can be transported long distances in ships and aircraft and lie dormant 
until arrival months later.  When temperature and moisture are favorable, eggs quickly 
mature into adults allowing acute explosions of mosquito populations.     
Aedes aegypti mosquitoes do not swarm for mating but are attracted to each other 
by wing beats and pheromones (Kettle 1984).  When females seek blood meals, their 
wings beat at a characteristic 500 cycles per second and produce a 20 decibel-sound 
wave, signaling males that they are ready for mating. After mating and an adequate blood 
meal, the female’s ovaries begin to develop, and approximately 21-23 hours later her 
eggs are ready for depositing.  
One unique property of this mosquito species is that mating and feeding can occur 
within the same area, usually within the vicinity of the host.   Kettle (1984) proved this 
theory by demonstrating that both male and female mosquitoes have two corresponding 
peak landing times on humans controlled by circadian rhythms.   Females and males both 
have their first peak between five and six p.m. Females have their second peak between 
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six and seven a.m. and males have their second two hours later, between eight and ten 
a.m.  This close proximity between male and female peaks indicates that natural rhythms 
inside both sexes are directed so that females can have a blood meal and afterwards not 
have to fly to a different location to mate.  This distinct adaptation of Aedes aegypti 
allows it to have close associations with humans throughout its entire life cycle, limiting 
the amount of space it must occupy to survive. 
Dispersal is the key ecological component of Aedes aegypti’s lifestyle that 
influences yellow fever epidemiology.  Harrington et al. (2005) conducted a study to 
determine Aedes aegypti’s dispersal by examining patterns of twenty-one mark and 
recapture experiments undertaken over an eleven year period (1991-2002) in a dengue-
infested region of Thailand.  Their results showed that the majority of mosquitoes were 
actually recaptured in the same house or an adjacent house from the one in which they 
were released, indicating an overall minimal dispersal.  A few records from this 
experiment indicate a maximum dispersal distance of 512 meters, demonstrating that 
some mosquitoes move over larger distances.  However, their results demonstrate that 
dissemination of dengue fever within and among communities in Thailand most likely 
occurs through human movement and not mosquito dispersal.  
Getis et al. (2003) examined spatial clusters of Aedes aegypti in its developmental 
habitat in two neighborhoods of Peru.  Their study found that adult mosquitoes cluster 
strongly within a household or weakly within a proximity of thirty meters from the 
household, and not more than ten meters away from water sources in which they laid 
their eggs. Cluster patterns of dengue infections in the neighborhoods over short periods 
of time were found to be determined by the mosquito’s restricted flight range and 
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frequent blood-feeding behavior.  This led Getis et al. (2003) to believe that the 
entomologic risk of human dengue infection should be addressed from a household level 
at frequent time intervals. 
Though Harrington et al. (2005) and Getis et al. (2003) examined the effects of 
Aedes aegypti dispersal on dengue fever, their results may also prove applicable to the 
dissemination of yellow fever, in part because the two diseases share similar familial 
relationships and ecologies.   
2.4.3 The Host: Clinical Features 
 Yellow fever virus, after being peripherally injected into a human through the bite 
of a mosquito, will incubate in the blood for a period usually lasting three to six days 
(Knipe et al. 2001). The disease can produce a range of symptomotology, varying from 
mild to severe, depending on host-specific genetic and immunological factors. Mild 
yellow fever is many times overlooked and misdiagnosed, mainly because of the 
difficulty of clinically distinguishing it from other infections—namely viral hepatitis, 
falciparum malaria, leptospiral infections, typhoid, Rift Valley fever, and Q fever.2 
Symptoms of mild yellow fever can also resemble those of drug-induced or toxic hepatic 
pathology.  
Severe yellow fever is much easier to distinguish and diagnose than mild yellow 
fever (Knipe et al. 2001).  It begins acutely with fever, chills, severe headaches, 
generalized myalgia, lumbosacral pain, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, and minor gingival 
hemorrhages and epistaxes.  A constantly rising temperature is followed by bradycardia.3 
This array of symptoms lasts about three days and parallels the period of infection, in 
                                                
2 In 1878, once a yellow fever epidemic was established, diagnosis of mild yellow fever probably led to 
more false positives than miss-diagnoses; however, this topic will be discussed in the following chapter. 
3 Known diagnostically as Faget’s sign. 
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which the virus is found in the blood.  After the viral load is immunologically 
counteracted, there is a period of remission usually lasting 24 hours in which symptoms 
mitigate and fever decreases. Following is a return of fever and symptoms, with more 
frequent vomiting, epigastric pain, prostration, and jaundice—the cardinal sign of yellow 
fever.  During the second phase of symptomotology, the virus is absent in the blood and 
antibodies begin to appear. Bleeding is manifested at this stage through ‘coffee-ground’ 
hematemesis (vomito negro), melena, metrorrhagia, ecchymoses, petechiae, and blood 
diffusion through mucous membranes.  Dehydration results from vomiting, and renal 
collapse is noted by a sudden increase in albuminuria and decreased urination.  Increased 
jaundice, hemorrhages, rising pulse, hypotension, and uremia culminate in death usually 
on the seventh to tenth day of illness in twenty to fifty percent of severe yellow fever 
cases.  Usually death is preceded by physical signs of hypothermia, agitated delirium, 
intractable hiccups, hypoglycemia, stupor, and coma. In extremely rare cases, recovering 
patients will go through a period of intense weakness lasting one week to three months, 
with sudden death occurring at the end of convalescence or even after recovery due to 
cardiac and renal complications and/or failure.4 Despite treatment, once patients present 
with hemorrhagic fever there is a fifty percent mortality rate (Singh 2005).   
Severe cases of other viral hemorrhagic fevers, including Dengue, Lassa, 
Marburg, Bolivian, Argentine, Congo, Crimean, and Ebola viral diseases, present with 
similar symptomotology to severe yellow fever except for the jaundicing, which is the 
hallmark sign of yellow fever (Knipe et al. 2001).  Modern diagnosis depends on 
histopathological identification of the virus through isolation of virions or antigens. 
Virions are most easily extracted from serum on the fourth day of illness, but they can 
                                                
4 See the last section of Chapter Three for a case from the 1878 Memphis Epidemic. 
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also be found in blood up to the fourteenth day of illness or even in liver tissue after 
death.     
2.4.4 The Host: Pathophysiology 
Many of the symptoms of yellow fever can be explained through careful review 
of yellow fever pathophysiology (Knipe et al. 2001).  Yellow fever virus is both 
neurotropic (affects nerves) and viscerotropic (affects internal organs).  However, it is 
mostly distinguished by its effects on liver pathology.  The hepatic lesion created by 
yellow fever leads to coagulative necrosis of midzone hepatocytes and causes demarcated 
swelling of the liver lobule.  Liver degeneration results in the formation of distinct 
Councilman’s bodies and intranuclear eosinophilic granular inclusions.  Around the 
eighth day of infection, these inclusions lead to vacuolar fatty change of the liver (fatty 
tissue replaces necrotic tissue). Ultimately, the loss of functioning liver tissue leads to 
decreased filtering out of bilirubin from blood and jaundice. In the kidney and heart, 
similar acute swelling, necrosis, and fatty change can also occur. In some cases, edema 
and petechial hemorrhaging of the brain occurs.  Most of this pathology progresses 
without an inflammatory response. 
 Hemorrhagic pathogenesis usually manifests because of decreased synthesis of 
vitamin K-dependent coagulation factors normally produced by the liver (Knipe et al. 
2001).  Hemorrhaging and erosion of the gastric mucosa as a result of decreased 
coagulative function leads to hematamesis, or vomito negro (Singh 2005).    
2.4.5 Treatment and Control 
 Once yellow fever is contracted, treatment is supportive (Knipe et al. 2001).  Due 
to the lack of sufficient facilities in the geographic locales where modern cases of yellow 
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fever exist, the success of intensive care units in delivering palliative fluid management 
for correction of hypotension and electrolyte/acid/base balance is unknown.  Yellow 
fever can be prevented by vaccine and diminished with the help of vector control.5 The 
vaccine, yellow fever 17D, is a safe and efficiently administered live viral vaccine 
developed and prepared by the World Health Organization.  As an alternative to 
vaccinations, at-risk areas for urban yellow fever with high Aedes aegypti populations 
need only eliminate potential breeding sites like old tires and containers, treat their water 
with temephos (abate), spray insecticides, or use Gambusia minnows to eat larvae in 
pools.  Vector control for jungle yellow fever is impractical. 
2.5 The History and Geography of Yellow Fever 
 There is no doubt that yellow fever has existed for centuries.  Though the earliest 
record of yellow fever did not appear until 1495 in Santo Domingo,6 practically no one 
doubts that it existed before then (Marks 1976).  Most scholars believe that the virus had 
its origins in Africa, where the slave trade carried it to the Caribbean where it became 
endemic from about 1635 onward.   
Urban yellow fever existed in the New World up until the beginning of the 
Twentieth Century, when human vaccination and vector control limited it to sylvatic 
cycles.  Before then, yellow fever was likely maintained in human reservoirs in Central 
America and the Caribbean, and each summer the disease spread northward to the United 
States as Aedes mosquitoes re-commenced their warm-natured life cycles.  The disease’s 
path paralleled that of human transportation routes as both infected humans and 
mosquitoes dispersed via ships, trains, river boats, and wagons. However, the disease 
                                                
5 Today, cases occur in areas where populations go un-immunized and where vector control is absent. 
6 The first record in Africa was in Sierra Leone, 1754. 
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only afflicted urban areas, as rural areas did not have adequate human or Aedes 
populations to propagate the disease (Carrigan 1994).   
 In 1647, the first record of an urban epidemic began in Barbados, a country which 
in previous years had witnessed a very large English immigration (Marks 1976).  It is 
likely that pre-exposed Dutch traders and African blacks carried the virus to the island, 
where the epidemic proved particularly virulent for the never-exposed English 
immigrants.  
In 1693, the first outbreak of yellow fever in British North America occurred in 
Boston, Massachusetts, from a ship arriving from Barbados (Marks 1976).  Subsequent 
epidemics occurred in Charleston and Philadelphia in 1699.  In 1702, another epidemic 
hit New York, killing 570 people out of a population that was not to reach 8,000 until 
1730.  However, for thirty-five years after the New York epidemic, yellow fever did not 
spread farther north than Charleston, South Carolina.  
In 1761 the fever reached Vera Cruz from Cuba, where it wiped out British forces 
besieging Havana (Marks 1976). Withdrawing forces then carried it to Philadelphia, 
where an epidemic ensued.  Another 30 year time period then elapsed wherein no 
epidemics occurred in British North America.  However, from August to October 1793, 
an outbreak in Philadelphia left 4,000 people dead. In 1795, an epidemic in New York 
killed 732 out of an estimated population of 50,000. In 1798, another epidemic in New 
York wiped out 2,000 more people.  From 1798 onward, yellow fever only spread as far 
north as Virginia, and was never to reach the Northeast again. 
 For the South, however, the dawn of the Nineteenth Century was the beginning of 
a continuum of repeated epidemics.  New Orleans, whose first epidemic was in 1796, 
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witnessed countless mortalities and spent millions of dollars over the next one hundred 
years on public health measures related to yellow fever.  During this time, the city and its 
port served as the center of epidemic spread throughout the South, as railroads expanded 
and steamships grew faster (Marks 1976).  In 1905, the last year that New Orleans 
experienced a yellow fever epidemic, over 5,000 cases and 1,000 deaths were reported 
(Knipe et al. 2001). 
 One of the most significant historical events associated with yellow fever was the 
Napoleon’s selling of Louisiana to America at the turn of the Nineteenth Century (Marks 
1976, 156).  In 1800, Napoleon had reacquired the Louisiana Territory from the Spanish 
Empire. At the same time, Pierre Toussaint L’Overture was leading a struggle for Haitian 
independence. Napoleon, engaged in European campaigns, was not able to devote his full 
attention to suppressing L’Overture’s insurrection.  Simpson (1980, 683) recounts what 
happened:  
In characteristic fashion Napoleon met the situation with force.  In the spring of 1802 a strong 
contingent of French under the command of Leclerc, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, landed in Haiti, 
assumed the offensive, and defeated the blacks.  And then disaster struck.  On the wings of Aedes 
mosquito was borne the force that the legions of the French Consul could not combat.  Forty 
thousand men—soldiers, sailors, officers, and civilians—died of yellow fever.  In November 
Leclerc, the commanding general, died of the disease, and in January news of the debacle reached 
Napoleon.  A few weeks later he was telling Talleyrand, “I renounce Louisiana—the whole 
colony,” and was offering two startled Americans, who had come over hoping to buy New 
Orleans, enough land to make all or part of the 15 states.  Napoleon had his fill of the New World, 
where the swamps swallowed his generals and legions.  
 
It so happened that the United States was able to double its size and gain one of the 
largest river basins in the world—the great Mississippi Valley—as an indirect result of 
yellow fever.   
 The building of the Panama Canal is another significant historical event in which 
yellow fever played a role.  Oldstone (1998) recounts the event: Compagnie Universalle 
du Canal Interoceanique, the French company that finished the Suez Canal, wished to 
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construct a canal that would link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans at the mid-point of the 
Americas allowing ocean going traffic to bypass Cape Horn in Chile.  In 1881, 
construction of the canal began. By 1882, there were 2,000 men working on the project, 
of which 400 died of yellow fever the first year and 1,300 the second year.  Mortalities 
averaged about 200 men per month.  Yellow fever killed such a large number of workers 
that the company abandoned the project and faced bankruptcy.  Nearly twenty years later, 
Theodore Roosevelt decided to try and finish the transoceanic canal project.  During this 
attempt, his appointed Yellow Fever Commission discovered that through vector control 
yellow fever mortalities could be reduced dramatically. As a result, workers completed 
the Panama Canal in 1914.  The success of the Panama Canal’s completion in an 
environment of yellow fever led to a plethora of anti- Aedes aegypti campaigns 
throughout Latin America in the Twentieth Century. As a result, urban yellow fever 
disappeared from this region in 1942 (Knipe et al. 2001). 
Today, yellow fever is contained in the Amazon basin and adjoining savannas and 
forests in animal and mosquito reservoirs that enable the jungle yellow fever cycle to 
perpetuate itself (UTMB, 2005).  Most cases are a result of humans entering these areas.  
However, collapse of vector control in Central and South America has allowed Aedes 
aegypti populations to proliferate in areas and regions where it has long been absent. 
However, no significant outbreaks of urban yellow fever have occurred there in recent 
years (Knipe et al. 2001). In 1996 and 1997, six cases of yellow fever were reported in 
Santa Cruz, Bolivia. One of the carriers had not left the city, indicating that urban 
transmission was involved. In 1998, French Guiana confirmed its first case of yellow 
since 1902.  
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Apart from South America, yellow fever is only found in tropical Africa.  There, 
yellow fever has transcended the sylvatic cycle and has caused many recent urban 
epidemics with high mortality rates. In 1960-1962, an outbreak of yellow fever in 
Ethiopia infected 100,000 people and killed 30,000 out of a population of one million, 
despite the use of vaccines (Oldstone 1998). From 1986 to 1991, Nigeria experienced a 
series of outbreaks that also involved hundreds of thousands of people (Knipe et al. 
2001).  In 1990, the disease spread from Nigeria to Cameroon, causing an epidemic that 
involved an estimated 20,000 people and 1,000 deaths.  
 
Figure 2.3: Map of Endemic Zones of Yellow Fever in 1996 (Image Courtesy 
of the CDC Public Health Image Library, 2005) 
 
The yearly global incidence of yellow fever around the world is estimated by the 
World Health Organization to be about 200,000 cases.  Most of these cases are in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where estimates of the at-risk population are about 450 million people 
(Knipe et al. 2001).  In South America, yellow fever is endemic in nine countries. Yellow 
fever has never occurred in Asia, perhaps because the host population is cross-protected 
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with dengue immunity and that Asian strains of Aedes aegypti show low-vector 
competence. Figure 2.3 is a map of endemic yellow fever areas.  
Although public opinion may argue that the threat of yellow fever is presently 
absent, all the elements needed for a significant outbreak are in place: an urban vector, 
yellow fever maintained in sylvatic reservoirs, and a low level of immunizations in 
human populations (Knipe et al., 2001). 
2.6 Yellow Fever in 1878 
 Yellow fever occurred in repeated epidemics throughout the Nineteenth Century 
in the southern United States.  However, none of these epidemics was as lethal and 
disastrous as the one that occurred in 1878 in the Mississippi Valley.  This single 
epidemic ravaged cities from New Orleans to St. Louis, killing between fifteen and 
twenty thousand people and costing approximately $200,000,000 (Bloom 1993).  Most of 
the mortalities occurred in this region’s urban areas: 4,000 died in New Orleans, 1,000 
died in Vicksburg, and 5,000 died in Memphis.7  The epidemic reached such levels of 
human disruption that all trade, traffic, mail, and commerce were halted for four months 
in one of the most heavily traveled commercial waterways in the world.   
 The epidemic of 1878 began somewhere in the West Indies, and by the twenty-
sixth of July had reached New Orleans (Oldstone 1998).  A day later it appeared 240 
miles away in Vicksburg, Mississippi.  News of the spreading epidemic was telegraphed 
throughout the Mississippi Valley, but most places gave little heed to these warnings. In 
Memphis, the Daily Appeal reported:  
                                                
7 Though only 1,000 more deaths occurred in Memphis than in New Orleans, this number is perhaps large 
enough to indicate that the Memphis population was more immunologically naïve than the New Orleans 
population. 
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We learn from New Orleans that 24 people have died of yellow fever there in the past few days.  
We need not fear in Memphis.  We were never in as good a condition from the sanitary point of 
view.  Our streets and alleys were never as clean, and strict attention is now being paid to the 
enforcement of sanitary regulations on private premises.  Nothing in our atmosphere invites that 
dread disease.  There are no grounds for alarm on the part of our people.  The yellow fever is not 
endogenous to our latitude and unless imported here there is no reason to fear it.  It cannot be 
imported as long as our sanitary laws are enforced. (Oldstone, 1998, 48) 
 
Needless to say, the epidemic reached Memphis three weeks later with its first reported 
case, Mrs. Kate Bionda, on the thirteenth of August.  The next day, fifty-five cases 
appeared in Memphis, and an all-out panic ensued in the city as people tried to flee the 
scourge by foot, rail, horse, wagon, or whatever they could find.  City officials urged 
people, “Keep cool! Avoid patent medicines and bad whiskey!  Go about your business 
as usual; be cheerful and laugh as much as possible” (Oldstone, 1998, 49).  But this 
turned out to be no laughing matter.  In Memphis, by the first part of September, two 
hundred people were dying per day, and by the middle of October over 5,000 people had 
died.  By Thanksgiving it was over, and a memorial meeting was arranged to praise the 
victims, the 17,000 who contracted the disease, the people who sent aid, and the 111 
physicians who came to serve the sick.8   
 The epidemic of 1878 was unique from other yellow fever epidemics in that it 
carried a heavy lethality over a large geographic area. Many scholars, such as Bloom 
(1993), Oldstone (1998), Knipe et al. (1991) and Carrigan (1994), would agree that the 
strain of yellow fever that disseminated the Mississippi valley that year was unusually 
lethal. Bloom (1993) bases his assumption on the fact that a much larger proportion of the 
black population died in the 1878 than in other years. As he explains, a commonly known 
characteristic of yellow fever is that blacks, especially those of West African descent, are 
particularly less likely to develop severe cases of yellow fever than Caucasians of the 
                                                
8 Sixty percent of physicians in Memphis lost their lives during the epidemic. 
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same exposure.9 The explanation for this may be found in the origins of yellow fever, 
tropical Africa, where generations of disease may have conferred a genetic resistance 
among Africans—similar to what is found with Sickle Cell Anemia and malaria. Another 
factor that makes analysts think that the epidemic of 1878 was especially virulent is the 
effect it had on children.  Normally, children would have been conferred immunity at an 
early age through prior epidemic exposure.  However, in 1878, most of the victims were 
children.  In New Orleans alone, children under ten comprised over half the list of dead 
(Bloom, 1993; Carrigan, 1994).   
                                                
9 Bloom calls this “Creole immunity” (11). 
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- CHAPTER THREE - 
 
DR. J.M. KEATING’S ACCOUNT OF THE MEMPHIS YELLOW FEVER 
EPIDEMIC OF 1878 
 
 Dr. J.M. Keating’s A History of the Yellow Fever: the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 
1878, in Memphis, Tennessee (1879) is not only the primary data source for this study, 
but also a remarkable achievement in summarizing the events that befell Memphis in 
1878.  His book provides a comprehensive summary of both quantitative and qualitative 
data that is a prime source for physicians, geographers, historians, and even politicians.  
As he notes in the preface, Keating (1879, vii) was stimulated to write his book by a large 
number of “intelligent citizens” who wished to know about the origins, progress, and 
results of the yellow fever epidemic that year. To answer their questions, he collected 
thousands of accounts from victims, professional health boards, and newspaper articles 
related to the epidemic.  His book, as he wished, has become a monument to all the 
victims, families, medical workers, and residents of Memphis who suffered that year, as 
well as a tribute to all those who helped the city through volunteer work, money, or 
supplies. 
3.1 Contemporary Medical Opinion 
 The most striking aspect of this book to a modern reader is how effectively the 
information is placed into its historical context.  At the time it was written, very little was 
known about the etiology of yellow fever, but physicians and scientists had ideas about 
where, when, why, how, and who it attacked.  Though these postulations today seem 
naive, they were far removed from the theories of disease origins from the previous five 
centuries: miasmatic theories, divine intervention theories, and purifying theories that 
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were mostly developed from the Black Plague (Knapp 1989).   Nonetheless, by Keating’s 
time, germs and transmissible agent theories were in their infancy.   
Keating (1879, 13) defined yellow fever as follows: “like Asiatic cholera and the 
small-pox, it is assigned to that class of disease known as xymotic (from xyma, the Greek 
word for yeast).  These diseases are produced by invisible germs floating in the 
atmosphere, which, taken into the blood through the lungs, are afterward propagated by 
the excreta and invisible emanations of the patients.”  Keating did not know that yellow 
fever was a virus, that it was transmitted by mosquitoes, or that it had nothing to do with 
human excreta.  Credit thus must be given to Keating for his attempt at an explanation of 
yellow fever epidemiology through his empirical observations.   
 Keating explains the ambiguous nature of yellow fever by taking as many 
opinions from medical experts and researchers as he can.  He does not, however, support 
or deny any of them.  Some of the opinions are as follows: Dr. Faget, from the faculty of 
Paris who worked 25 for years in close association with yellow fever in New Orleans, 
remarks: “the yellow fever is one of paroxysm continually from 24 to 72 hours and 
sometimes 96 hours” (Keating, 1879, 16). Dupuy de Chamberry reported: “the yellow 
fever of this place [New Orleans] is a disease sui generic, the product of local causes, and 
is never contagious or exportable” (Keating, 1879, 16).   A panel of medical experts 
appointed by Congress noted, “atmospheric air…is the usual medium through which the 
infection is received into the human system; it is not carried by atmospheric 
currents…nor by any modes or vehicles of conveyance other than those connected with 
human traffic and travel” (Keating, 1879, 17).  Dr. L.S. Tracey said,  
Yellow fever occupies a singular position between the contagious and non-contagious disease.  
The poison is not, like that of small-pox, directly communicable from a sick person to a well one; 
but, although the emanations of the sick are connected with the spread of the disease, they seem to 
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require an appropriate nidus in which to germinate and develop.  This nidus must be warm and 
moist, and there the germs, whatever they are, lie and grow or, in some way, develop until they are 
able to migrate.  The germs are portable, and may be conveyed in baggage or merchandise 
(fomites) for hundreds or thousands of miles.  If not so conveyed, its progress is very slow.  In 
1822, in New York, when it gained a foothold in Rector Street, it appeared to travel about 40 feet a 
day until killed by the frost.  It often leaves a house or a block intact, going around it and attacking 
those beyond, with no assignable reason.  A thin board partition seems to have stopped it on 
Governor’s Island in 1856, and an instance is related where it attacked the sailors in all the berths 
of one side of a ship before crossing to the other.  Such apparent vagaries are, in the present state 
of our knowledge, inexplicable.   
 
In contrast, Dr. P.V. Schenck remarked, “yellow fever is an infectious disease, but it is 
neither miasmatic nor contagious.  The poison of yellow fever is not generated in the 
human system; it is generated externally; it attacks persons, and may be carried in vessels 
and trunks; for the presence of the disease an imported germ, or descendent of an 
imported germ, is necessary” (Keating, 1879, 25).  
 As the above accounts demonstrate, medical opinion was mired with numerous 
theories and opinions about yellow fever.  Clues to the nature of yellow fever were 
abundant, but their unexplainable characteristics still meant that the mystery was far from 
being solved. As urban physicians, some were able to link transportation networks to the 
spread of the disease. Others like de Chamberry were of the opinion that yellow fever 
was non-transmittable.  Yet others, like Dr. Tracey, were reluctant to put forth their 
opinion. As noted by his account, it seems that in 1879 Dr. Tracey was still 
contemplating the facts.  It is apparent that in all these accounts modern biological 
theories had not been developed, and scientists in 1878 were still thinking in terms of 
religious, humanistic, or completely simplistic disease ideology.   
Despite the controversy over yellow fever’s etiology, Keating was able to tie a 
few threads together and make some connections in the above observations.  He (1879, 
29) noted nine favorable conditions for the development of yellow fever, many of which 
are geographical: 1) low-lying swampy ground “near the level of a tropical sea;” 2) the 
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combination of high temperatures after heavy rains; 3) southerly or easterly winds; 4) 
many people and their excreta in a small spaces; 5) long periods of calm weather; 6) 
exposure of decaying organic matter; 7) inefficient city drainage and the build-up of filth; 
8) deficient ozone; and 9) miasmas venting from disturbed soil. He was partially correct 
in at least four of the above conditions. The summer of 1878 was characterized by a heat 
wave that no doubt induced Aedes aegypti proliferation.  High densities of people made 
disease dissemination more likely because of convergence of infected and susceptible 
hosts.  Calm weather made conditions favorable for human social activity in which 
human movement could have dispersed the disease across the city.  Inadequate city 
drainage increased the number of places in which Aedes aegypti could breed.   Keating, 
however, was not able to link his conditions to vector ecology or human social dynamics 
because he did not have knowledge that Aedes aegypti was the vector or that yellow fever 
was a transmissible viral agent.   
3.2 Identifying the Source 
In 1878, the origins of yellow fever were still unknown, made worst by the fact 
that it seemed to re-appear decade after decade with no apparent reason.  Keating (1879, 
95-96) was able to link Memphis’s epidemic to a likely beginning:  
The history of the steam-tug John D. Porter is one of the most interesting episodes of the 
epidemic of 1878. For two months she, with two barges, moved up the Mississippi and Ohio 
rivers, a floating charnel-house, carrying death and destruction to nearly all who had any thing to 
do with her.  Twenty-three persons died on her from the time she left New Orleans until she 
anchored near Pittsburg…The Porter was afterward put in proper sanitary condition by her 
owners, and her two barges were destroyed.  Many other steamers passed from New Orleans in 
August…among them was John A. Scudder, on which one case developed on the 7th of August—a 
lady—who was put off at Refuge Landing, Mississippi, and died there.  The Golden Crown, which 
passed up some days before, and at Memphis put off several passengers, was not allowed to land 
at any of the points above.  She tried to evade the quarantine, it was said…William Warne, one of 
the first cases…had been a deck hand on the Golden Crown.  
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Authorities thus had some idea as to the source of the Memphis epidemic.  It no doubt 
came up the Mississippi on a vessel; they knew that quarantine could help keep it from 
spreading; but unusually, cases began emerging not only along the landing but across the 
city. How did it evade quarantine and get from the vessel into the inner city? One simple 
missing link, the mosquito, bewildered contemporary investigators.  However, they could 
still explain yellow fever diffusion from city to city as a result of human transportation 
networks.   
Micro-environmental diffusion patterns also confused contemporary scientists.  
Why does yellow fever attack a household, or a block, or every other house along a 
street? Keating (1879, 34) describes one anomaly as follows: 
Dr. Webb returned from Memphis to his home carrying the germs of yellow fever about his 
clothing.  His wife and children took the disease and died, and yet he escaped.  How was this?  His 
duties kept him in the open air, more or less, while the female inmates of his family were more or 
less confined to the house, where the germs found a lodgment from his cast-off clothing.  In this 
room the poison evidently existed in the greatest quantity; and the constant occupants were the 
first to suffer.  At Jackson, a gentleman who had been to Memphis hung up his clothes in a 
wardrobe, the weather being warm. After several days his wife opened the door and took the 
garments out. We would suppose that in a close, hot room the poison would multiply itself in this 
time until the air would be heavy with it; and so it seemed in this case, for the lady took the yellow 
fever and died, followed in due time by the rest of the family.  Why was not the importer of the 
disease the first to take it?  
 
Unbeknownst to himself, Dr. Webb was probably a carrier of yellow fever; he brought 
the infection home and was bitten by a mosquito that transferred the infection to his 
family.  Mosquitoes were also likely to disseminate the disease from his home to 
susceptible neighbors. But in 1878 no one realized this progression.  In fact, the means by 
which the disease originated and spread were to remain a mystery for almost thirty more 
years, when scientists finally confirmed that yellow fever was a transmissible viral agent 
and that Aedes aegypti was its vector. 
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3.3 The Events in Memphis, 1878 
Memphis was in a debilitated state when the epidemic reached it in the late 
summer of 1878. City residents and officials were not prepared to handle a yellow fever 
public health disaster. Through poor administrative decisions, and an upper class hard-hit 
by the Civil War thirteen years earlier, the city was bankrupt in 1878 with over 
$5,500,000 in debt (Keating 1879).   In 1878, the great railroad and river transportation 
hub of Memphis had dwindled to trade levels slightly higher than those in 1860. Land 
values in Memphis had also plummeted after the war, reducing the tax base and causing 
city officials to seize lands, further diminishing taxable property. Financially, the city was 
in a bad situation to handle a momentous yellow fever epidemic.  
 The demographic setting of Memphis in 1878 was not much better prepared for 
an epidemic than the financial setting. In 1878, the population had increased to twice that 
of 1860.  However, it did not double in workforce or some other economically favorable 
constituency.  As Keating (1879, 101) puts it, 
Negroes, who, under the system of slavery, which prevailed up to the breaking out of the Civil 
War, had been productive laborers in the cotton fields of the adjoining States, attracted by the 
excitement it affords, flocked to the city, where at least one-third of them were added to the ranks 
of the very poor, and either as petty thieves or worthless paupers, depredated upon the industrious 
few of their own color, but for the most part upon the thrifty whites…thus the non-producers—
those who consume without laboring and live without the least regard for the obligations of good 
citizenship—were increased to the proportions of a small army.  
 
The increased population overwhelmed the municipal police and health services in an 
already burdened financial situation.  In addition, the increase in the African-American 
population could have served as an infective, non-symptomatic reservoir of yellow fever, 
magnifying the diffusion of the epidemic. According to Keating’s figures, of the fourteen 
thousand blacks that were to remain in the city, only eighteen percent were to die of the 
disease.  This is compared to eighty-two percent mortality in the six thousand whites that 
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remained.   Many of blacks probably initially thought they would not be affected, 
underestimating the particular virulence of this epidemic: 
The colored citizens became alarmed over the fact that many of their race were down sick with the 
fever, they not being exempt from the ravages of the scourge.  The colored people were cautioned 
that their houses and premises be kept clean and properly disinfected daily with carbolic acid; that 
they should also be more prudent in their diet; in fact, that they should observe all the rules of 
health which were observed by large numbers of white people…of the 119 cases of yellow fever 
reported in the twenty-four hours ending at six o’clock, August 28th, thirty were colored people, 
and yet negroes were to be seen at any and all hours of the day, in the alleys and back-ways, 
gorging themselves with watermelons and all sorts of wholesome trash. (Keating, 1879, 149-151) 
 
A much larger percentage of African Americans were to die in 1878 than in prior 
outbreaks.  The epidemic, spreading up the Mississippi in late July 1878, was to reach a 
financially and demographically strained city.   
Reports of yellow fever deaths in New Orleans reached Memphis through 
telegraph on July twenty-sixth.  Three days earlier, on the twenty-third, the steamship 
Emily B. Souder had passed the New Orleans’s wharf—its purser evaded quarantine and 
later died of yellow fever. Memphis, on the twenty-seventh of July, as a result of the 
news from New Orleans, placed quarantine stations at the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad and the Memphis and Tennessee Railroads.  Three days later, at seven p.m. on 
the thirtieth, the infamous John D. Porter passed the Memphis docks.10  Dr. Erskine, a 
medical officer, boarded the ship and noted one man sick.  The ship’s officer told Erskine 
that four men had died, but that they died of overheating or sunstroke because they had 
been working next to the furnace and drinking ice water.  The John D. Porter was 
ordered not to stop but to continue up the river.  On the first of August, a man checked 
into City Hospital and died of yellow fever; he had escaped quarantine and gained entry 
to the city by railroad. 
                                                
10 On its journey up the Mississippi, the John D. Porter is thought to have dispersed yellow fever as far as 
1,000 miles up-river from New Orleans (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1998). 
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On the second of August, another case of yellow fever, the Golden Crown deck 
hand William Warren, was admitted to City Hospital.  He died three days later in 
quarantine.  The most infamous case in Memphis, and the first ‘officially’ reported 
yellow fever death by the city’s Health Board, was that of Mrs. Kate Bionda, an Italian 
snack-house keeper along Front Street, on the thirteenth of August. The very next day, on 
the fourteenth, there were twenty-two new cases of yellow fever and two deaths.  
 Controversy exists over who was responsible for importing the epidemic to 
Memphis.  Most sources (Baker (1967), Oldstone (1998), Bloom (1993), Coleman 
(1987)), site Mrs. Bionda as the center of diffusion.  But Keating, even in 1879, was 
skeptical of this opinion.  He (1879, 107)gives the following explanation: 
It was ascertained, after the epidemic was fairly established, that many cases had occurred before 
her’s [Mrs Bionda’s].  Mrs. C.W. Furguson, boarding at the residence of Attorney-General G.P.M. 
Turner, 279 Second Street, states that on the 21st of July a colored man came up the river, whose 
wife was cook for Mr. Turner.  This woman had a residence in the yard back of the Turner House, 
and abutting on an alley which runs from Second to Main Street.  Her Husband had been taken 
with a severe chill on the boat on the morning of the day on which he landed, and when he reached 
his home had a very high fever for several days.  For this his wife treated him with hot teas, and he 
recovered.  Subsequently, and about ten days after his arrival, Mr. Turner’s two children were 
taken with well-marked cases of yellow fever.  One of them died, and the other recovered.  In the 
meantime, a young man named Willie Darby, an employee of Farrell, the oyster-dealer, who lived 
at 277 Second Street, and who was in the habit of passing to his meals through the alley infected 
by the colored man, although he slept in the third story of his house, was taken with the fever, but 
recovered.  He was nursed by his aunt and not visited by a doctor.  His was the second case; it 
occurred on the 25th of July.  The good woman who saved his life took the fever and died, as did 
nearly all who lived in the house or in the houses near by.  Mrs. Zack (white), who resided on the 
opposite side of the street, died of fever on the 5th of August, and her brother-in-law, taken on the 
10th, died on the 13th, the day before Mrs. Bionda died.  About the 1st of August the steamer 
Golden Crown landed three ladies, who were taken to the residence of Esquire Winters, on 
Alabama street, and among them the fever developed, it was reported, about the 10th of August.  
All in his house but the ‘Squire were attacked, but recovered.  Before this, Mr. John Campbell, 
whose house was opposite that of Mr. Winters, was taken sick, and died, it was reported at the 
time, of congestion, but afterward was proven to be yellow fever, as his wife and many others 
were subsequently attacked in the same way, and developed well-defined cases of yellow fever.  
 
This important observation by Keating brings up several questions.  How could these 
cases been overlooked by the Health Board in Memphis?  Why do other accounts of the 
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epidemic not mention them?  Why do officials not consider them as origins of the 
epidemic, or even as pieces to the diffusion puzzle?   
 Authorities in Memphis at the start of the epidemic did not have time to answer 
these questions.  Within hours of the report of Mrs. Bionda’s death, the city became 
chaotic.  People paniced, and a massive evacuation of the city began.  Traffic flooded all 
rail lines and roads out of the city, and the countryside quickly became riddled with 
Memphis urbanites.  Surrounding towns and cities were overwhelmed with the influx of 
refugees.  Others, afraid that Memphis evacuees would bring the epidemic to them, set up 
shotgun quarantines.  Refugees who could not find shelter outside of the city went into 
camps set up by the Health Board—Camp Joe Williams, Camp Smith, Camp Griffin, and 
Camp Wade. In total, by the twenty-fourth of August, twenty-five thousand of the forty-
five thousand citizens of Memphis had left the city.   
 By the end of August, the city panic was over.  In fact, the city was completely 
quiet.  People stayed in their houses, and the only movement was that of health workers, 
supply lines, or men burying the dead.  White women seldom ventured outside, and 
children never.  By mid-September, the epidemic had reached its peak: 
September 20th—The following is a copy of a telegram sent to New York, to be read in Booth’s 
Theater on the 21st: “Deaths to date: 2,250; number sick now, about 3,000; average deaths, sixty 
per cent of the sick.  We are feeding some 10,000 persons, sick and destitute, in camps and in the 
city.  Our city is a hospital.  Fifteen volunteer physicians have died; twenty others are sick.  A 
great many nurses have died—many that had the fever before, and thought themselves proof.  
Fever abating some to-day, for want of material, perhaps, and things look a little more hopeful.  
We are praying for frost—it is our only hope.  A thousand thanks to the generous people of New 
York.” (Keating, 1879, 165) 
 
Accounts from the epidemic bear witness to the great tragedy this epidemic produced. As 
one story recalls, “a woman heroically nursed and buried her husband and three children, 
and she lay down—a walking case—and, as she said, gladly welcomed death… women 
were found dead, their little babes gasping in the throes of death beside the breasts at 
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which they had tugged in vain” (Keating, 1879, 111).  Another account recalls the decay 
of a dead body: “half the putrid remains of a negro woman were found in an outbuilding 
near the Appeal office; the other half had been eaten by rats, that were found dead by 
hundreds nearby” (Keating, 1879, 111).  Another account describes the helpless nature of 
family members to aid those around them:  
Upon a bed lay the living and the dead—a husband cold and stiff, a wife in the agony of 
dissolution. On the floor, tossing in delirium, were two children of this pair, and beside them their 
cousins, two little girls, themselves sick.  To complete the repulsiveness of the scene, and give it a 
touch of disgusting horror, a drunken man and a drunken woman, parents of two of the little fever-
baked girls, were reeling and cursing, stumbling over the dying and the dead. (Keating, 1879, 184)  
 
One of the accounts notes a man who died a rather sudden death.  On the twenty-seventh 
of September, he was found lying on his back on Market Street; next to him was a basket 
of potatoes he had just purchased. He was on his way home when just a hundred yards 
away he fell down and died.  He had had a severe attack of the fever a couple of weeks 
prior and since then had been convalescing.  As the account recalls, “he was suppose to 
be beyond any danger” (Keating, 1897, 169).    
 Reaction to the epidemic was outstanding.  Aid poured in from all over the United 
States and even Europe (see Keating’s Appendix 337-363). New York City alone sent 
$43,800.  Long trains entered Memphis daily carrying medical supplies, clothing, and 
provisions.  But as Keating recalls, they were “accompanied always with a heartfelt 
sympathy, and often by advice and by theories of treatment, earnest, but generally ill-
advised” (Keating, 1879, 115).  No amount of aid could resist the yellow fever scourge. 
No treatment was sufficient: “those who resorted to lime-water, to sulphur in the boots, 
shoes or stockings, to sulphur and gin, to regulated quantities of gin, to liver-pads, to 
garlic, to onions, to quinine, to cathartic pills, calomel, chlorinated lime, or any thing 
else, invariably proved easy victims, and died rapidly” (Keating, 1879, 31).  City officials 
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left to combat the epidemic did what they could.  One account describes a Mr. Denie, 
who threw five hundred barrels of unslacked lime into Gayoso Bayou to rid it of its filth.   
 Keating also makes note in his book of the ridiculous acts that were committed in 
the city during this vulnerable time.  He describes looting, pillaging, and even rapes of 
dead corpses, mostly in the wake of the refugee evacuation. As he (1879, 113) so boldly 
states it, “they made of the epidemic a carnival.” One account notes what happened: 
With four or five thousand vacant houses, abandoned by their inmates, or by the death of the 
servants left to take care of them, hundreds of them filled with valuable family treasures, enough 
to excite the cupidity of the criminals who swarmed the unguarded streets, on which, sometimes, 
not a living thing was to be met with by night or day, it required more than the earnestness and 
determination of ordinary times to prevent the excesses so much dreaded by thinking men as the 
worst of the results of the epidemic.  It was estimated, at one time, that not less than two hundred 
tramps and thieves invaded the stricken city, coming from no one could tell where, ultimately 
going no one could tell wither. They stole the badges of nurses, and, representing themselves as 
Howard employees, gained entrance to homes where the fever had paralyzed all it had not killed. 
(Keating, 1879, 130) 
 
In another account, a Mr. Townsley had left his wife to die and had abandoned his two 
children, who then had to become wards of the hospital.  In another instance, reported in 
the Avalanche, a woman at Camp Joe Williams fell sick and had to be brought to the 
hospital.  When her husband was asked if he wanted to go, he replied, “No, if I goes, who 
takes care of my dog?” To this the newspaper editor outright remarked, “the brute should 
be kicked out of camp right then, he is not fit to live” (Keating, 1879, 158).  Other 
accounts remark even of nurses stealing watches and other valuables.  Racial tensions 
also ran high, evidenced in the newspaper reports found in Keating’s book.  One account 
(Keating, 1879, 185) criticizes the colored people of Memphis for not helping out with 
their own race: 
A scene behind a door at No. 32 St. Martin Street…a dead negro boy lay upon the floor, and a 
tottering, fever-burned victim was handing a dipper of water to a delirious man lying on an old 
ragged quilt.  Negroes, well men, lived in scores of houses around, but not one could be prevailed 
upon to enter the place.  A brave white lady, disgusted with so much inhumanity, her self entered 
the house, taking oil and mustard.  This, however, was no rare case.  
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Keating’s accounting of the 1878 epidemic in Memphis is a dire testimony of the  
impact that yellow fever can have in an urban environment.  His work shows the 
desperation of both contemporary city officials and scientists to find an end to yellow 
fever epidemics. It no doubt provided these officials and scientists with a range of 
valuable information.  Even today, 127 years after the epidemic, the information that 
Keating provided still proves to be a valuable source for yellow fever investigations.   
 For the purposes of this study, the many accounts, testimonies, and newspaper 
articles provided by Keating will be left for a more qualitative examination.  However, 
his tables of the dead (pages 207-238) will support the quantitative analysis of this 
investigation.   
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- CHAPTER FOUR - 
MATERIALS, ANALYSES, AND METHODS 
 The approach used in this study was to create a database and GIS of yellow fever 
mortalities, map the dataset based on several types of modern temporal-spatial analysis 
techniques, and see what patterns would result.  Because of the uncertainty of what 
patterns were to be expected, this study began with a series of conventional methods of 
identifying disease diffusion.  However, as the results became more apparent and trends 
began to emerge, methods were fine-tuned to focus on the novel, unique patterns 
associated with the Memphis dataset.  As a result, the direction of this study turned from 
an analysis of macro-environmental diffusion patterns that existed in the whole city to 
micro-environmental diffusion patterns that existed within small city-block sections.   
 The methods, analyses, and results of the macro-environmental analysis that were 
not related to the micro-environmental analysis will not be discussed here.  This 
information is placed in the appendix of this thesis as a reference for future 
investigations. 
4.1 Materials  
The data source used in this study is Keating’s A History of the Yellow Fever: The 
Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878, in Memphis, Tennessee.  His book, as the last chapter 
recalls, was written in 1879 for the purpose of recognizing those who donated time, 
money, and medical help to the epidemic.  The book also contains a chapter devoted to 
listing the dead. Entries in this chapter with usable addresses were manually extracted 
from the list and four variables were recorded: date of death, name of victim, race of 
victim, and address.  In many instances, the victim’s name was recorded as “unknown,” 
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the race was missing, and the name of the street did not have an associated number or 
intersection.  For this study, only those victims with locatable addresses were used.  
These include addresses with street intersections, street numbers, or identifiable places 
(i.e., “Peabody Hotel,” “County Jail,” etc.). Of the 10,000 or so cases represented in the 
chapter, 1,965 were extracted as potentially usable.  As such, the data should be viewed 
as a sample of the epidemic. 
Detailed address-level city maps from the year of 1878 were unavailable.  
Therefore, to locate the victims’ addresses and for use in the GIS, Sanborn Fire Insurance 
Maps from the years 1888 and 1897 were obtained in ADOBE® PDF format from the  
ProQuest® Corporation, a frequently used for-profit provider of historical maps. Sanborn 
maps generally contain building structures, streets, public works, water features, and 
other variables related to fire insurance.  The 1888 set of Sanborn maps includes a 
general reference map, two indices showing on which sub-map a particular street address 
is located, 64 detailed sub-maps, and a legend. This map set’s coverage fails to reach all 
sections of the Memphis downtown area, so another set, from 1897, was required to 
fiareas not covered by the 1888 set.  The 1897 set contains two general reference maps, 
four pages of indices, and 192 sub-maps.  The degree of detail in both sets of maps is 
extensive, sometimes covering just a city block on each sub-map (explaining their 
numbers).  Though no reliable documentation could be found, it is hoped that street and 
address ranges did not vary extensively from 1878 to 1897.  
A general reference contemporary street map of downtown Memphis from 1898 
was obtained through the LSU Map Library from Dr. John Anderson to be used for visual 
display of the results.  Modern street maps of Memphis required for the georeferencing 
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process were obtained from the Census 2000 TIGER/Line Data database provided 
through the U.S. Bureau of the Census, available to the public online.   
4.2 Creation of the Database and GIS 
 Date of death, victim’s name, location of death, and race of 1,965 mortalities were 
entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Modern street data acquired from the 2000 
Census was brought into ESRI’s ArcView GIS 3.3 to provide for reference coordinates of 
the point data. Streets were clipped using the geoprocessing wizard to show only the area 
concerned. The first set of Sanborn maps from 1888 was aligned as best as possible to the 
modern street data, and saved as an IMAGINE image file for later reference.  In order to 
be brought into the image analysis function of ArcView, Sanborn maps had to be opened 
in ADOBE Reader, selected for the wanted features, magnified, copied, imported into 
Microsoft PowerPoint, converted to JPEG format, and imported into ArcView.  From this 
step three points could be selected and matched to the modern street data using the align 
tool, stretching and manipulating the Sanborn image until it fell within its modern 
geospatial context. 
 After the first set of maps was georeferenced and aligned, street names were 
selected systematically from the spreadsheet using the ‘find’ command and heads-up 
digitized in ArcView.11 An identification number was assigned to each mortality and 
recorded in the representative point feature of the digitized theme. When all locatable 
mortalities were accounted for in the digitized theme, the script gcoordpt.ave was used to 
                                                
11 Note: if the first set of Sanborn maps proved inadequate for a particular address 
location, the appropriate map from the second set was brought into ArcView as noted 
previously and used as a georeference.)   
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match an X,Y-coordinate to each point.  The resultant attribute table was merged with the 
original spreadsheet to produce a list of mortalities with their respective coordinates.   
 At this point the database contained 1,587 of the 1,965 mortalities extracted from 
Keating’s list.   However, 254 of the 1,587 contained mortalities located at ‘City 
Hospital.’ Because of the ambiguity of this location as a point of death or a point of 
infection, these data were removed from the set and placed into a standby file.  As a 
result, 1333 mortalities remained as usable data.   
The final set of mortalities and their coordinates was sorted by date.  A new 
column was created and named ‘Day No.’, which ran from 1 to 120 and corresponded 
numerically to when the first case of the epidemic emerged, 12 August 1878, and when 
the last case emerged, 10 December 1878.  For spatial analysis functions, an ‘intensity’ 
column was also added and filled for all mortalities with a value of 1.  In addition, a final 
column was added with new identification numbers ranging from 1 to 1333 for easy 
reference to and from the spreadsheet.   The spreadsheet was converted to a text file and 
imported as a table into ArcView, and an events theme with respective attributes was 
created from this table to produce a GIS of the 1878 Memphis yellow fever mortalities.     
4.3 Methods and Analyses 
Naturally problems develop when working with historic data sets of disease, 
especially from a time when the epidemiology of the disease was unknown and 
diagnostic tests were unavailable to dichotomize differential diagnoses.  Therefore, this 
study assumes that all deaths in the data set were correctly diagnosed as cases of yellow 
fever mortality, and that date, name, race, and address were reported correctly.  It is 
presumed that the usable addresses were a random yet representative sampling without 
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biases of the 10,000 cases of fever that occurred in 1878. Data quality and its impacts on 
the results will be addressed in the final chapter.  
4.3.1 The Hot Spot Analysis 
 Statistical spatial analysis was completed using CrimeStat III, a spatial analysis 
program for the examination of crime incident locations offered through the National 
Institute of Justice by Ned Levine and Associates (Levine 2004).  This software allows 
the user to reference and analyze a data file with such variables as X and Y coordinates, 
intensity, weight, and time.  Based on a data set, it can compute spatial descriptions 
(mean center, standard deviation, median center, convex hulls, etc.), distance analyses 
(Nearest Neighbor Indices, Ripley’s K Statistics, Distance Matrices, etc.) ‘hot spot’ 
analyses (Hot Spot Analysis I and II), and spatial models (Kernal Density Interpolation 
and Space-Time Analysis).   
The CrimeStat routine considered in this study was ‘hot spot’ analysis. Hot spots, 
simply speaking, are clusters of events in a dataset.  They represent areas where there are 
concentrations of events (in this case yellow fever mortalities) that meet user-defined 
parameters.  Of the many statistical methods of computing hot spots, this study will use 
the nearest neighbor hierarchical clustering (Nnh) technique.  This method identifies 
groups of events that are close spatially.  The CrimeStat Nnh routine requires the user to 
input a threshold distance and the minimal number of points to be included in a cluster.  
The software identifies groups of points using the threshold distance as a reference. If 
groups of points meet both threshold and minimal number criteria, they are clustered as 
first-order hot spots.  First-order hotspots can be further examined for second-order 
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clustering and so on, but for the purposes of this study only first-order hot spots will be 
used.  
Considering that the data of this study spanned over 120 days, running each day 
through the software to compute the daily hot spots would not have been appropriate 
given the sometimes small number of deaths per day.  Therefore, data were organized 
into 12 weeks so that Day 1 was the start of Week 1.  Dividing the data into weekly 
periods creates the problem of discretely partitioning data into potentially false 
categories. Therefore, these data were again dichotomized into another set of 12 weeks 
that were ‘shifted’ to straddle the previous weekly breaks.  Between Days 81 and 120 
only three sporadic deaths of yellow fever occurred, so hot spots for these three deaths 
and their respective weeks (Weeks 13, 14, 15, and 16) were not calculated.   
Each of the two sets of twelve weeks was run through Crimestat III to determine 
hot spots.  In addition, two additional CrimeStat examinations of the complete mortality 
list and of just those of September, the most prominent month of fever, were performed.  
For all data hot spot analysis parameters were set for a minimum cluster of 10 cases over 
a search radius of 250 meters (clusters of ten were chosen by default and a search radius 
of 250 meters was chosen because it roughly corresponds to a 6-block city section).  
These parameters generated hot spots in all the data except for Weeks 7 through 12.  
4.3.2 The Micro-environmental Analysis  
As a novel approach to investigating micro-environmental diffusion, the methods 
used in this section were based on street-level examinations of five sections of the city of 
Memphis.  Two of these sections were selected because they contained multi-death 
residences; two others were selected because they contained hot spots from the above 
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analysis; and the final section was selected because it contained what appeared to be a 
visual ‘cluster’ of spots in an area away from the four prior sections. 
 Once a section was chosen, a buffer was placed around the area to select for all 
deaths that occurred within 250 meters. The first death to occur in the selection defined 
the beginning of that section’s temporal scale, or time 0.  Deaths were then digitized onto 
their respective Sanborn maps using symbols that represented the time at which they 
occurred in the temporal scale (i.e., if they were co-primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.). 
Arrows were drawn to connect death events that are related temporally.12  
Each section’s cartographic representation was further analyzed to investigate 
patterns that occurred within and around multi-death residents, hot spots, and areas of 
dense ‘activity.’   
                                                
12 Arrows are meant as a visual aid for temporal progressions.  They do not represent mosquito movement, 
human movement, etc.  If events were not connected by arrows, then they could not be rationally or 
temporally linked to other cases occurring within the section.  Many cases lying on the outer portions of the 
diagrams are not linked because of the possibility of diffusion occurring from outside of the diagrams. 
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- CHAPTER FIVE - 
RESULTS 
5.1 The Hot Spot Analysis 
 Figure 5.1 is a cartographic depiction of hot spots by week.  Week 2 produced 
two hot spots in the north sector of the city.  They correspond to the area around Main 
and Exchange Streets (near the Navy Yard and Union Depot) and Market and Fourth 
Streets (lying near Gayoso Bayou on a line directly East of where the first deaths in 
Memphis occurred).   Week 3 also resulted in two hot spots, one directly south of the 
Week 2 Market and Fourth Street hot spot and the other farther north near Commerce and 
Second Streets.  Week four produced ten hot spots.  Four of them lie almost directly in a 
line corresponding with Main street; another lies in a northeast sector of the city, where 
one of the three original (Day 1) deaths occurred. The remaining five lie in locations near 
or between the branches of Gayoso Bayou, possibly indicative of the disease’s spread 
southward along this waterway.  Week 5 also begins with three hot spots in the north 
sector, only slightly eastward than the previous week’s by about a block.  Moving 
southward, three more hot spots occur along Main Street in the south sector of the city 
just west of Gayoso Bayou.  All six of these hot spots lie on a north-south line paralleling 
the bayou.  The four other hot spots lie in basins of the bayou.  From Week 4 to Week 5 it 
is evident through this analysis that the disease moved more distally along both Main 
Street and Gayoso Bayou in a chain-link like fashion.   Week 6 contained three hot spots 










































































 Hot spot analysis for the month of September and the entire data set gave further 
clues to the spread of the disease throughout the city.  As Figure 5.2 shows, hot spots lie 
along a north-south plane in an almost linear fashion in both these sets.  Hot spots are 
also nearly identical in both sets, indicating the strong impact of the month of September 
in the epidemic.  The entire datasets contained additional hot spots along the outskirts of 
the city, indicating that the disease spread outward after the month of September.  The 
spread of disease along Main Street and Gayoso Bayou, as mentioned above, is also 
evident in this figure.   
5.2 Micro-environmental Diffusion Patterns 
The first city section to be analyzed for its micro-environmental diffusion patterns 
was the 9-block partition containing Shelby, Main, St. Martin, Mulberry, Talbot, and 
Huling Streets (refer to Figure 5.3). This section was chosen for analysis because it 
contained a multi-resident locality, 563 Main Street, with eight deaths. Yellow fever 
claimed the first victims in this section on the first of September, relatively early in the 
epidemic, beginning with two cases at 518 Shelby Street. These two cases defined the 
beginning of the diffusion in this area and were designated as occurring on Day 0.   
Following these first two index cases by a day was another death at 518 Shelby 
Street.  Three deaths occurring in the same residence within two days of each other is 
indicative that these three people were exposed to the disease at the same time and place.  
Had one of them been exposed independently and brought the disease back home with 





























































































more deaths about 6 to 12 days later.13  It is unlikely that the disease originated within the 
vicinity of 518 Shelby Street because these are the first deaths to occur in this section.14 
Therefore, these three people must have been exposed to an infected mosquito or 
individual outside of this section.  Because it is unlikely that the three of them would 
have been exposed to yellow fever in three different localities at the same time, they must 
have contracted the disease at the same location. 
An examination of the surnames of the residents at 518 Shelby Street reveals that 
this group of deaths was probably not a family unit.  The first two to die were Gus 
Lihnbenner and an ‘unknown’ man.  The third to die was a Gus Lindhilen.  Fourteen days 
later, the fourth resident at 518 Shelby Street, Otto Nelson, died.  ‘Lihnbenner,’ 
‘Lindhilen,’ and ‘Otto’ Nelson all appear to be names of European origin. It could be 
possible that this residence contained a cohort of European immigrants who lived and 
worked together. However, to be certain, nativity information would be necessary.   
After the three deaths at 518 Shelby Street on Days 0 and 1, a death occurred 257 
meters away at 47 Huling Street on Day 3.  The origins of this death are unclear, though 
based on the locality’s isolation it is likely that the disease was imported here by the 
victim and not disseminated from surrounding localities. 
Five days later (on Day 8), the next death in this section occurred, 90 meters away from 
the death at 47 Huling Street.  This death, at 563 Main Street, was the first of eight deaths 
                                                
13 The time period it should take between the symptomotology of the index case and that of the secondary 
cases (see Chapter 2); if index and secondary symptomotology occur at a constant time interval from one 
another, then this interval can be ‘shifted’ from being measured at onset of symptoms to onset of death; the 
only problem with this assumption is that onset of symptoms and death varies considerably from case to 
case. 
14 It could be possible that deaths in the immediate area are not registered in the ‘usable’ database.   
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to occur in this single residence. All eight deaths at this residence were of the same 
surname, revealing that this must have been a family unit.  Based on their first 
 
Figure 5.3: Micro-environmental Diffusion of Yellow Fever around the Multi-death 
Residence of 563 Main Street, Memphis, 1878  
 
names (Bessie, Lee, Willie, Maud, Liddie, etc.) it could be possible that this was also a 
family of American background.  The first death in this unit, “Mr. Arnold,” occurred on 
Day 8, and six days later, on Day 13, “Mrs. Arnold” and “Bessie Arnold” died.  
Following Mrs. Arnold and Bessie by two days, five other members of the Arnold family 
died on Day 15.   
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563 Main Street is the first example of in this study of a ‘mini-epidemic’ that 
occurred in a multi-death residence.  Based on the time interval from the first death to the 
others, six and eight days, it is evident that this disease disseminated solely within this 
household, meaning that it was a ‘contained’ or ‘controlled’ mini-epidemic in which 
exposure was related to family mixing.    
A day after Mr. Arnold’s death on Day 8, a death occurred at 519 Shelby Street, 
directly across from the European cohort of 518 Shelby Street.  In this instance, it is 
likely that the victim’s close proximity to the index cases resulted in his or her infection.  
The surname, Williams, gives no clues to whether or not social mixing with the European 
cohort was involved.   
On Day 13, 90 meters15 away from 518 Shelby Street and on the same block, 
James Hameron died at 25 Vance Street.  Because of his death’s proximity to the outer 
portion of the map, it is unclear whether the disease could have spread from the European 
cohort, been imported, or disseminated from the blocks not shown in this diagram.  The 
same situation applies to the death at 572 Shelby Street, which occurred on Day 15.   
Two deaths, located between the European cohort and the Arnold family, occur 
on consecutive days in consecutive residences.  Gertrude Ording, living at 539 Main 
Street, died on Day 15, and Maggie Reynolds, living at 543 Main Street, died on Day 16. 
It is unclear whether or not social interactions played a role in these two deaths.   
The final deaths to occur in this city section were on Days 23, 26, 31, and 34.  
Two of them, occurring on the 23rd and 31st day, are at 554 and 555 Main Street, 
respectively, a couple of houses down from the Arnold residence.  These deaths occur 
within the range of possible infection from the Arnolds.   
                                                
15 Note: distances were measured in ArcView as Euclidean distances. 
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The second city section to be analyzed was the one that contains Causey, Avery, 
Allen, Hernando, Elliot, and Vance Streets (refer to Figure 5.4). This partition includes 6 
irregular city blocks.  Like the previous section, it was chosen because it contains a multi-
residence locality, 111 Elliot Street, with seven deaths.  The first mortality in this section 
was on August 20th, when Birdie Russel of 14 Allen Avenue, the 19th death in the 
database, died.  This death marked the start of time, Day 0, for this section.   
The next death to follow Russel’s did not occur until Day 11, at 107 Vance Street.  
This residence contained four usually spaced deaths: D.P. Flynn on Day 11, R.E. 
Williams on Day 29, and R.E. and R. Flynn on Day 40. Evidently this was a family unit, 
as three of the four deaths had the surname Flynn. Considering that there is an 18-day 
interval between the first and second deaths, and that their surnames differ, it is not likely 
that the first was the source of the second.  However, there is an 11 day time difference 
between the second and third/fourth.  This means that R.E. Williams could have been the 
source of dissemination for R.E. and R. Flynn.   
Across the street from the Flynn residence, at 108 Vance Street, was another 
series of four deaths. Chris Hosmar and an ‘unknown’ died on Day 13, Mary Whitter 
died on Day 14, and Mary Switzer died on Day 15.  Considering that these four deaths 
occurred on three subsequent days, it is not likely that these four people were exposed at 
different localities or that one of them brought the disease to the others.  Once again, a 
likely explanation for this cluster of deaths is social interaction. It is also possible that 
108 Vance Street was involved in the mini-epidemic of 107 Vance Street.  If this were 
the case, then the long time interval between the first and second deaths at 107 could be 
linked by a transfer of the infection from 107 to 108, then back again from 108 to 107. 
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Figure 5.4: Micro-environmental Diffusion of Yellow Fever around the Multi-death 
Residence of 111 Elliot Street, Memphis, 1878 
 
Day 11 also saw a death, Mary Hays, at 42 Allen Street.  This residence contained 
another death, Cynda Hays, on Day 31, but before this time three deaths occurred down 
the street: Mrs. Kite at 22 Allen Avenue and Matt Harris at 46 Allen Avenue on Day 20, 
and a “Crissie” at 44 Allen Avenue on Day 23.  On Day 39, Will Fleming died across the 
street, at 37 Allen Avenue. These deaths, though from separate residences, seemed to be 
linked both temporally and spatially.  This cluster, once again, is likely due to complex 
social interactions. 
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On Day 13, deaths began to emerge on Hernando Street, 140 meters away from 
Allen Avenue.  In this area, three deaths occurred at 224 Hernando Street on Days 13, 15, 
and 18 (Mrs. John G. Miller, John G. Mud, and C.H. Summers, respectively) and three 
deaths at 209 Hernando Street on Day 16 (Edward Anderson, Ed Slocum, and an 
unknown man) and one death at 217 Hernando on day 44 (Nancy Blake).  Because this 
area is located on the outer edge of the map, the origin of yellow fever here is uncertain.  
However, it appears as though dissemination occurred at 209 and 224 as a result of these 
people interacting in time and space.  Their deaths fall within a range of five days, and 
because there are no outliers it is not likely that any of them imported the infection.  One 
plausible explanation is that they were infected in the same space (i.e., the same house).   
Another area of this map that shows similar trends to the Hernando Street and 42-
46 Allen Avenue areas is that of Causey Street.16    In this area, seven deaths in ten days 
were to occur in six residences.  The first, an unknown, died on Day 20 at 128 Causey 
Street.  Two days later, on Day 22, G. Page died at 147 Causey and G. E. Page died at 
151 Causey.  Another two days elapsed before Annie Young died across the street at 135 
Causey on Day 24.  The next day Josephine Schiller died at 152 Causey.  Five days later, 
on Day 30, W.C and J.C. Dukes died at 129 Causey. Noting the temporal spatial 
relationships in this area, it seems like infection in this area was a combination of family 
units, social structure, and possible housing communities.  For the last two cases, at 129 
Causey, it is possible that infection came from across the street, at 128, ten days earlier. 
Because of the time interval, it is likely that the death at 128 was the source of the 
infection at 129.  However, the four deaths down the street, because they all fall within a 
three-day range, could not have served as reservoirs for each other.   
                                                
16 N. Rayburn on the 1899 Sanborn. 
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The third city section to be analyzed was four blocks northeast of the first section 
analyzed and contains Beale, Linden, Pontotoc, Main, Mulberry, St. Martin, and Causey 
Streets (refer to Figure 5.5).  This section contains seven blocks, two of which are 
intersected by Gayoso Bayou.  This section was chosen because it was identified by 
Crimestat as a hotspot for Week 2 of the epidemic.  The first death to occur in this section 
was Lucy Cleary on August 25th, set as Day 0, at 34 St. Martin Street.  Three days later, 
Mary Cummings died at 39.5 Causey Street, located across Gayoso Bayou about 123 
meters away. On Day 4 Mina Donnely died at 18 St. Martin Street, about 50 meters north 
down the street from Lucy Cleary, and on Day 6 George Otley died at 61 Linden Street, 
about 50 meters south down the street from Lucy Cleary.  Another death on Day 6, Henry 
Hesson, occurs at 45 Beale Street, about 150 meters northwest across the adjacent block 
from Lucy Cleary, and at 16.5 Causey Street, about 50 meters from Mary Cummings. On 
Day 14 a death occurred at 82 Pontotoc Street, with deaths at 94 Pontotoc on Day 16 and 
at 75 Pontotoc on Day 22. On Mulberry Street, a death occurred on Day 17 at number 45.  
The next day two deaths occur, one 30 meters northeast at 34 Mulberry and one 30 
meters southwest at 38 Linden Street. Farther southeast, at 44 Pontotoc Street, a death 
occurred on Day 16; this is 150 meters east from the other deaths on Pontotoc and 140 
meters south from the deaths on Mulberry.  This series of death seems to be sporadic 
rather than contained, with deaths not radiating from a center but occurring in seemingly 
disconnected locations.  This could be attributed human associations that link what seem 






















































As the diagram shows, the area of Causey Street located in this section contained 
a ‘hotbed’ of activity, with 26 deaths in 18 residences spanning from Day 3 to Day 64.  
At 17 Causey Street, three deaths occurred: M. Flannagan on Day 8, Katie Flannagan on 
Day 12, and Fred Lanster on Day 23.  Because there is a four day interval between the 
first two cases, it is uncertain whether or not one contracted the disease from the other or 
both were bitten by the same infected mosquito.  At 40 Causey Street three deaths occur 
again at the same residence, this time on Days 16, 16, and 20.  Once again, the four-day 
interval between deaths makes predicting the origin difficult.  However, unlike 17 Causey 
Street, 40 Causey Street is surrounded by a ring of deaths which range from Day 3 to day 
23 and from House 39 to 50 almost inclusively. This area could represent a mini-
epidemic that not only occurred within a single residence but a confined neighborhood.   
Causey Street is unique because of the large number of deaths that occurred 
within epidemic range of one another.  Gayoso Bayou, which intersects the block 
between Causey and St. Martin, could have been an area of high population density 
because it is the first location for residences east of the Mississippi River (the business 
district of downtown Memphis lies between the Mississippi and Gayoso Bayou).    
The fourth city section analyzed was an area identified through the hotspot 
analysis of Week 3 (refer to Figure 5.6).  It is the area containing Washington, Poplar, 
Exchange, Market, and Fourth Streets.  Deaths begin in this area with one of the four 
original cases, Rachel Jones, on August 12th.  Her residence, 158 Poplar Street, was 35 
meters away from Gayoso Bayou, and saw two more deaths on Days 5 and 8.  Between 
her house and the Bayou three deaths on Days 3, 4, and 7 occurred at 159, 162.5, and 
163.5 Poplar Street. Based on the short time interval between these deaths, it is not likely 
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that Rachel Jones was the source. Farther up the street from Rachel Jones and the bayou, 
at 131, 144, 147.5, 148, 152, and 157 Poplar Street, a mini-epidemic occurred between 
Day 8 and 51; the temporal sequence here (8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 51) indicates that 
the earlier cases could have been the source for the later ones.  115 meters away, a similar 
mini-epidemic occurred at 138, 141, 148, 147, 145, and 158 Washington Street. Like the 
area of Poplar Street, this area also borders the bayou and has a temporal sequence (6, 10, 
16, 18, 19, 26) indicative of epidemic diffusion. A third example of this pattern is seen at 
99, 106, 111, 113, and 115 Market Street, 100 meters away from Gayoso Bayou and 120 
meters away from Poplar Street.  The temporal sequence here (4, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29) is 
also a likely result of epidemic diffusion. 
The temporal-spatial patterns of these mini-epidemics, like those of the last 
section analyzed, indicate that social dynamics within a large population density may 
have resulted in a higher number of mortalities than normal for this section.  
At the top left corner of the diagram can be seen a multi-death residence with six 
reported deaths.  This locality actually represents St. Peter’s Orphan Asylum.  The 
temporal sequence of deaths (16, 16, 30, 36, 52, and 74) is fairly sporadic, indicating that 
an unusually complicated diffusion pattern could have existed at this locality.  
The fifth and last section analyzed contained Winchester, Jackson, Overton, Main, 
Second, and Third Streets (refer to Figure 5.7).  This section was selected for analysis 
because of its high density of deaths, visualized on a map of the entire city (See 
Appendix).   The first death in this area was Mary Williams on August 17th at 57 Main 
Street.  This death is temporally isolated from those immediately around it, indicating 
that it was not the origin of disease spread in this vicinity.  On Day 3, however, a case 
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was reported at 83 Winchester Street, just 50 meters from Gayoso Bayou.17 Two days 
later, on Day 5, a death occurred at 91 Commerce Street, approximately 35 meters away 
from the death on Winchester.  On Days 9 and 11, two deaths occur down the Street from 
83 Winchester, at 79 and 86 Winchester, respectively.  These two deaths are within 
epidemic range of the death on Day 3, indicating that the resident at 83 Winchester may 
 
Figure 5.6: Micro-environmental Diffusion of Yellow Fever around a Week 3 Hot 
Spot, Memphis, 1878 
 
have served as the source.  On Days 11,12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, and 20, six deaths occur 
around the Day 5 death on Commerce Street. These deaths are located up the street (61, 
63, 68, 77, 78 Commerce Street) and on the same block (74, 76, 77 Jackson Street and 
                                                


























































58, 60, and 76 Third Street) as 91 Commerce Street.  Once again, these deaths fall within 
epidemic range of the Day 5 death.  However, none of these deaths follow a coordinated 
distance-decay pattern from the Day 3 or Day 5 deaths.  Temporally they are sporadic, 
while spatially they are clustered.   
A similar temporal-spatial pattern is seen in another mini-epidemic located at the 
top of this diagram.  Again, there is clustering of deaths spatially but a disconnected 
temporal dispersion. Along Main Street (at numbers 27, 35, 47, 56, 57, 77, 81, 88, and 
89), deaths occur in a temporally sporadic fashion (18, 13, 22, 5, 23, 21, 18, and 12, 
respectively).   
The temporal-spatial relationships in these two areas indicate that a complicated 
mode of dissemination occurred within this section.  It is not clear what mechanisms or 
dynamics may have caused such widespread dissemination in this lot.
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- CHAPTER SIX – 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study have shed new light on the subject of historic urban 
yellow fever diffusion.  Though many scholars realize that yellow fever is a disease with 
complex urban diffusion patterns, the nature of these complexities has been left relatively 
unexplored.  As mentioned in Chapter 3 (Keating 1879), many scientists in 1878 had 
linked urban yellow fever diffusion to human movement, but the lack of knowledge that a 
vector was involved made their theories hard to prove.  With the discovery in 1900 that 
Aedes aegypti could transmit yellow fever from human to human and that this was the 
likely vector in urban epidemics,  the basis of yellow fever epidemiological research 
mostly shifted from the idea that human movement disseminated the disease to ideas that 
Aedes aegypti disseminated the disease.  With the resulting concept of ‘vector control’ 
after this discovery, and then with the production of a viable vaccine in the 1940s, urban 
yellow fever was controlled, maintained, and finally eradicated from North America—
and it became less and less the topic of medical research.  However, with epidemics re-
emerging in Africa and related fevers like Dengue in Asia, yellow fever research is once 
again being brought into the spotlight.  This time, investigators are re-examining the 
complexity of Flavivirus diffusion, and revisiting notions that human interactions play a 
greater role in urban dissemination than Aedes aegypti dispersal (Harrington 2005, Getis 
2003).   
This study has shown the value that temporal-spatial cartographic representations 
of city sections can have in identifying factors that influence micro-environmental urban  
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diffusion patterns.   Starting with the hot spot analysis, it was noted that clusters of deaths 
occurred in two areas: along Main Street and Gayoso Bayou.  This was the first hint that 
diffusion was occurring as a result of human social dynamics and population density.  To 
test this idea, an examination of the micro-environment proved necessary for two 
reasons: 1) to see if social mixing around multi-death residences played a role in the 
spatial structure of the disease dissemination, and 2) to control for an unknown 
population density.  By investigating the temporal sequence that occurred around multi-
death residences, it became possible to see if social dynamics were actually the cause of 
dissemination both within the home and the immediate area.  By choosing city sections 
that roughly represented the same geographic area, bias based on population density was 
reduced.  
Many patterns emerged from this examination.  Multi-death residences seemed to 
produce two types of temporal patterns. In the first pattern, multiple deaths occurred in an 
epidemic sequence that was indicative of a mini-epidemic within the residence.  At 563 
Main Street, for instance, it appeared as though an infected father was the source of 
dissemination in his home.  In the second pattern identified at multiple-death residences, 
the temporal sequence implicated that residents were bit by an infected mosquito and 
died around the same time—like at 111 Elliot Street. In this pattern, the temporal 
sequence was too clustered to indicate that dissemination occurred through different 
mosquitoes. With further investigation into social dynamics, it was discovered, based on 
surname, that the deaths at 563 Main Street and 111 Elliot Street were family units.  
However, an evaluation of the death surnames at another multi-death residence, 518  
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Shelby Street, revealed that the residents could have been part of a cultural unit.  These 
deaths, the first in their area, had to have contracted the disease in a locality away from 
their residence.  In this instance, workplace could have been the mechanism for the 
implicated social dynamic.   
 An evaluation of temporal-spatial relationships between single-death residences 
reveals a separate set of patterns.  In most of these cases (Weeks 2 and 3 hot spot areas), 
deaths occurred in a sporadic manner both temporally and spatially.  All locations with 
this pattern were within close proximity to Gayoso Bayou, an area of possible high 
residential population density. 
 The micro-environmental analysis, both at the multi-death and single-death 
residences, make it clear that disease dissemination in Memphis did not occur in a 
random patterns but in clustered patterns—thus leading to rejection of the null hypothesis 
for this study.   
As can be noted in Figures 5.2-5.7, clusters of deaths are surrounded by spatial 
“holes” that lie between clusters.  This indicates that epidemic diffusion occurred in areas 
that were susceptible and did not occur in areas that were not.  The underlying 
mechanism for yellow fever’s “selection” of particular areas is beyond the examination of 
this study.  However, it can be postulated that perhaps complicated social dynamics 
linked the areas of disease or that areas without disease contained a population that was 
less susceptible to infection. Further study with more information on parameters such as 
population density, economic variation over space, and nativity and age of inhabitants is 
needed to determine the exact mechanisms.          
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 It is likely that as investigators continue to explore historic disease data in their 
temporal-spatial context, more complex patterns of diffusion will be revealed.  At this 
point, it is clear that in the future traditional concepts of yellow fever diffusion will be  
challenged, especially as more findings reveal that human cultural and social factors play  
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- APPENDIX A: GENERAL DATASET OBSERVATIONS18 - 
 
  Figure A.1 is a line graph denoting the number of deaths per day. As evident in 
the figure, the most deaths occurred during the period from day 14 (August 26) to day 46 
(September 27).  The main thrust of the epidemic ended on day 81 (November 1), though 
two sporadic deaths occurred on days 94 and 120.  Mortality peaks can be noted 
throughout the epidemic about every three to five days. Figure A.2  is an accumulative 
frequency plot showing the typical curve of epidemic diffusion. Figure A.3 is a bar graph 
of the number of deaths per week, denoting similar results.  Note: eighty percent of 






















 Figure A.1: Temporal Distribution of Yellow Fever Deaths, Memphis, 1878 
                                                
18 The following methods, analyses, and results of this appendix were the brunt of a preliminary 
investigation meant to examine what general trends, if any, could be extracted from the database and GIS.  
It is placed here (and not discarded) as a reference to any future studies that investigate the Memphis 


























































Figure A.3: Yellow Fever Mortalities by Week, Memphis, 1878 
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- APPENDIX B: METEOROLOGY - 
 Unusual climactic variations for the year 1879 no doubt played a role in the 
spread of the epidemic across the Mississippi Valley.  The unusually warm temperatures 
and almost rhythmic rainfall were perfect conditions for A. aegypti multiplication and 
proliferation throughout the fall season. These conditions also undoubtedly led to 
increased human exposure, as warmer temperatures may have led people to move around 
more or even leave their windows open, especially at night.    
Analysis of meteorological data provided by Keating (1879) shows that mortality 
spikes usually follow rainfall by about three or four days (Figure B.1). Temperature, on 
the other hand, evaluated on a day-by-day basis, seems to have no correlation trends with 
mortality (Figure B.2). Humidity, which ties temperature and rainfall together, shows the 
closest relationship to mortalities, as humidity spikes correspond to epidemic spikes 
approximately two to four days later (Figure B.3).  Barometric data, as expected, shows 


















































































































































- APPENDIX C: EPIDEMIC ANIMATION - 
    To examine overall city diffusion, a day-by-day animation of the epidemic was 
created.  Using ArcView, each day’s cases were selected using the theme properties 
function. Once the day’s cases were plotted, their symbols were increased in size and 
made red.  A 0.1 mile kernel density analysis was performed on the previous day’s cases, 
and the results were placed under the current day’s symbols as blue densities. A 0.2 mile 
kernel density analysis was also performed on cases from two days before, and the results 
made yellow. Using 0.1 and 0.2 mile density assured that cases from previous days would 
not be hidden. The resultant view thus contained three features: red dots associated with 
the current day’s cases, blue densities associated with the previous day’s cases, and 
yellow densities associated with cases that occurred two days prior.   Each view was 
imported into PowerPoint, where slides could be overlaid and viewed sequentially to 
form a crude animation.  Animations using adaptive bandwidths were produced in a 
similar fashion. (All animations can be viewed from the link http://www.whocc.lsu.edu).   
 As can be seen in the animation, the majority of the activity in the first couple of 
weeks occurs within the northwest sector, but a few sporadic cases emanate from the 
southwest and east.  By the third week there is a line of continual deaths between the 
midpoints of the east and northwest.  From this line, it seems as if the deaths began to 
march down a north-south axis, paralleling both Gayoso Bayou and Front Street (along 
the Mississippi). Deaths seem to appear along these lines in three-day cycles.  In the 
southwest sector, deaths are less frequent in the first two weeks than in the northerly 
portions.  Cases seem to be maintained there on a three to seven day cycle.  By the third 
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week, however, the epidemic seems to have established itself at a point just a little to the 
north and east of the southwest sector (just south of the midpoint of the city).   
By the fourth week, the epidemic is city-wide, and it appears as though secondary 
cases begin to appear alongside the index cases of the first few weeks.  By the sixth 
week, the epidemic wanes a little, and deaths seem to occur in the center of the city, 
subside a couple of days, appear in the outskirts, subside, and appear back in the center.  
From then on, the epidemic seems to survive in remote cases in random parts of the city.  
This brings up an interesting question: how did these people hold out for seven weeks, 
escaping not only the first wave but subsequent waves? 
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- APPENDIX D: MEAN CENTER ANALYSIS - 
 Mean center is the mean of all X and Y coordinates in a set of data (Levine 2004).  
Conceptually, it is regarded as the ‘center of gravity’ (i.e., it is a point in a distribution 
where all other points are balanced if these points defined a plane that had the mean 
center as its fulcrum). Each week’s mean center was plotted on a map of Memphis and 
examined for its direction of movement from the previous week to the following week.  
In theory, this should produce a map showing the overall movement of the epidemic 
through the city.  However, it must be noted that this analysis is somewhat meaningless 
because it represents ‘averages’ of the entire city.  The location represented by the mean 
center does not represent an area of activity or a center of a cluster.  A more meaningful 
use of mean center would be to identify ‘sections’ of the city—or even identify weekly 
movement of mean center within micro-environments.  However, this is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Figure D.1 is a cartographic representation of each week’s mean 












































- APPENDIX E: MICRO-ENVIRONMENTAL DIFFUSION - 
 In an attempt to quantify geographic barriers to micro-environmental diffusion, a 
street-level examination of patterns from multi-death residences was analyzed in relation 
to the index cases to see if epidemic spread favored same residences, same sides of the 
streets, opposite sides of the streets, same blocks, or adjacent blocks.   Figure E.1 shows 

































Figure E.1 Placement of Deaths around Index Cases in Multi-death Residences, 
Memphis, 1878 
 
 To find multi-death residences that served as ‘mini-epidemics,’ time intervals 
from the index case were produced to see when the majority of deaths occurred in 
relation to the index.  If they fall near the index, then it should mean that the vector was 
located within the home and that the index did not contract the disease and then brought it 
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to the residence.  If they are dispersed from the index, then most likely the index served 
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- APPENDIX F: CHOROPLETH MAPS AND CITY SECTION DIFFUSION - 
To show weekly diffusion of fever through sections of the city, two sets of 
Choropleth maps were produced using grids and pre-defined shapefiles.  A grid system 
was created in ArcView using the script ‘grdmake2.ave’.  This script creates a grid over a 
polygon based on a user-defined area (in acres) for each cell of the grid.  After attempting 
several area sizes, it was decided that 100-acre cells adequately partition the city.  Death 
localities were then spatially joined to the grid’s attribute table, and summaries of the 
number of deaths in each cell were merged back with the original table.  At this point, 
Choropleth maps could be produced that represented the number of deaths per week per 
100-acre city section.    
The second set of Choropleth maps detailing weekly diffusion were made using 
pre-defined ‘traffic analysis zone’ (TAZ) shapefiles used in the 2000 Census. TAZ zones 
were used in this instance as an attempt to relate modern city partitions to 1878 events.  
Other modern partitions, like zip codes and census blocks, were not the appropriate size 
to partition the 1878 city boundaries.   TAZ Choropleth maps showing weekly diffusion 
were produced using the same methods as with the grid system. It must be noted that they 
in no way have any relation to underlying demographic or environmental factors.  They 
were simply used as a means of partitioning the city.  Each zone was analyzed to 
determine the number of deaths that occurred each week and mid-week.  This method 
produced temporal ‘nodes’ that coincide with the predicted infective time of new cases 
(about three to five days).   
 Figures F.1 and F.2 are step-wise depictions of the results.  The most notable 
outcome of this depiction is the steadfastness to which the disease remained in two of the 
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zones; these two zones correspond to three of the original (Day 1) deaths.  They are the 
Poplar and Front Streets region and the southwest area region (seen as pink in Week 11).  
This analysis suggests that the city diffusion occurred from these two main sections; it 
does not place the east sector noted above as significant. Unfortunately, TAZ zones show 
no relation to epidemic data and cannot be used to represent any underlying population, 
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